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DRUG CONTROL IN MASSACHUSETTS
The increasingly pervasive problem of drug abuse in contemporary
American society necessitates a firm response from the state. But the
seriousness of the abuse problem does not justify overly repressive
measures unduly inhibiting individuals in the free exercise of their
constitutional rights. Recognizing the power of the state to deal effec-
tively with the broad range of difficulties posed by the use of narcotic
drugs,' this Comment examines the constitutional implications of one
Massachusetts statute designed to control that state's narcotics prob-
lems.
2
The greater part of Massachusetts' drug law is modeled after the
Uniform Narcotics Drug Act,' the basic statutory scheme in a number
of states. In 1960, however, the Massachusetts legislature enacted
an additional provision of its own drafting, section 213A, reading in
part:
Whoever is present where a narcotic drug is illegally kept
or deposited, or whoever is in the company of a person, know-
ing that said person is illegally in possession of a narcotic
drug . . . may be arrested . . . and may be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five
years . . .. 4
The section contains two distinct clauses: the "presence clause" punishes
one present where drugs are illegally kept; the "companionship clause,"
one in the company of anyone in illegal possession of narcotics.
The effect of a literal interpretation of the "presence clause" is
devastating. Because the clause does not require knowledge, potential
culpability could reach absurd extremes. Were a spectator in Boston's
New Court House illegally possessed of narcotics, the entire court-
spectators, jurors, attorneys, and judges-would be guilty of a felony
under the language of the statute.' Although the Commonwealth has
utilized the statute to arrest persons unknowingly present where a nar-
1The Supreme Court has indicated that the states have broad police powers in
this area. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664-65 (1962).
2 Although this Comment is concerned primarily with a single state statute, the
problems discussed are not limited to Massachusetts. For example, in 1969 the New
Hampshire legislature enacted a similar provision. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 318-
B:26(II) (Supp. 1969).
3 Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 510 n2, 238 N.E2d 335, 336-37 n2
(1968).
4 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94, §213A (1967).
5 See Brief for Defendant at 9, Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508, 238
N.E.2d 335 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Buckley Brief].
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cotic drug was illegally kept,6 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts rejected the state's characterization of the statute as a "public
welfare" statute 7 and held in Commonwealth v. Buckley 8 that knowl-
edge was required to sustain a conviction under the "presence clause."
This scienter limitation, however, does not significantly restrict the
reach of the clause, for one aware of the presence of illegal narcotics
must now withdraw from the area or risk five years' imprisonment
regardless of whether he is attending a private party, a public folk
concert, a night club, or is merely present in a dormitory suite.
Because the "companionship clause" expressly requires knowledge
and because most of its terms have well-established meanings, only the
phrase "in the company of" was susceptible to judicial definition. In
Commonwealth v. Tirella,9 the court interpreted this phrase to require
"something that smacks of fellowship" 10 to bring an individual within
the clause's proscription; mere presence in the same place was insuffi-
cient to violate the statute.
This Comment will discuss the constitutional implications of sec-
tion 213A as interpreted in Buckley and Tirella. It will explore (1)
whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague, (2) whether it con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment, (3) whether it allows an im-
permissible inference of guilt based on mere association, and (4)
whether it abridges freedom of association. A brief review of both
cases will set the stage for the constitutional discussion.
I. Buckley AND Tirella: FACTS AND OPINIONS
William G. Buckley was arrested in the apartment of an acquaint-
ance in Boston and charged with being present where a narcotic was
illegally kept. The police entered the premises only a few minutes
after Buckley's arrival and found him seated at a kitchen table on
which they discovered an extinguished cigarette butt and an envelope,
both containing marijuana.'1 Holding the statute not unconstitutionally
vague, the court found that the "presence clause" required knowledge
by the accused of the facts necessary to establish his culpability. The
opinion summarily rejected Buckley's contentions that the statute
abridged his freedom of association or his right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.
6 For example, on 26 April 1968, police raided a Boston nightclub, arrested all 76
patrons, and charged them with violations of § 213A. Fifty of those arrested consulted
with the Civil Liberties Union, protesting that they were unaware that marijuana
was present in the nightclub. Id.
7 See Brief for Commonwealth at 5-7, Commonwealth v. Buckley, 354 Mass. 508,
238 N.E.2d 335 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Commonwealth Brief].
8354 Mass. 508, 238 N.E.2d 335 (1968).
9 355 Mass. -, 249 N.E2d 573 (1969).
10 Id. at -, 249 N.E2d at 575.
11 Commonwealth Brief 2.
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John A. Tirella was arrested and convicted under the "companion-
ship clause" after an officer of the police narcotics unit observed the
driver of an automobile in which he was a passenger purchase heroin
from a pedestrian. The court rejected each of Tirella's several con-
stitutional attacks upon the second clause of section 213A. Narrowly
interpreting the phrase "in the company of," the court held the statute
not void for vagueness because the phrase was definite enough to permit
men of common intelligence to understand its meaning.' Relying
without elaboration on the Buckley holding, the majority found that
section 213A neither abridges freedom of association nor imposes cruel
and unusual punishment.'3 The court avoided Tirella's contention that
the statute permitted an inference of guilt of the crime of possession
from proof of mere association and held that the legislature had created
a new substantive offense-the act of association itself.' 4  Thus the
court found it unnecessary to inquire into the rationality of any legis-
lative presumption of criminal behavior based upon the defendant's
association with a possessor. This facile resolution of important con-
stitutional questions and the strong opposition of the dissenting
opinion 15 raise the need for a deeper analysis of the issues decided in
Buckley and Tirella.
II. VOID FOR VAGUENESS
A. The "Presence Clause"
Relying on the standard test that "a law forbidding or requiring
conduct in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates
due process of law,"' Buckley argued that the phrase "present where"
in section 213A established a standard of conduct he could not be
expected to determine on his own. But the Massachusetts court
disagreed:
These words [whoever is present], coupled with knowledge,
do not import an unlimited area. The words must be given
a reasonable interpretation which would permit the knowledge
required to be proved. The language reasonably refers to a
somewhat restricted spaceY
In Connally v. General Construction Co., 3 the United States Su-
preme Court used the test relied upon by Buckley to hold invalid an
12 See text accompanying note 21 infra.
1 355 Mass. at -, 249 N.E2d at 576.
14 See id. at -, 249 N.E2d at 576.
15Id. (Spalding, Whittemore, & Reardon, JJ., dissenting).
10 Bucdey Brief 3 (citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964)).
17 354 Mass. at 513, 238 N.E2d at 338.
18269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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Oklahoma minimum wage law making criminal a failure to pay the
"current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is
performed" to persons employed by or on behalf of the state.'9 Finding
the word "locality" inherently vague, the Court noted that:
Two men moving in any direction from the place of opera-
tions, would not be at all likely to agree upon the point where
they had passed the boundary which separated the locality of
that work from the next locality. 0
The term "present where" in section 213A is similarly ambiguous:
must a person finding himself "present where a narcotic drug is
illegally kept or deposited" leave a nightclub, sporting event, or concert,
or may he avoid violating the statute merely by moving from the
immediate vicinity of the contraband? The nature of the conduct
proscribed necessitates an explicit definition. A violation of a statute
prohibiting the possession or sale of narcotics is clearly intentional,
but a section 213A violation may result when an individual unex-
pectedly finds himself in the presence of narcotics. The state should
define with utmost clarity how far and how fast he must flee to escape
the reach of the statute.
B. The "Companionship Clause"
The Tirella court sought to counter the defendant's argument that
the "companionship clause" was vague by narrowly defining the term
"in the company of," but its attempted definition merely increased the
vagueness of the clause.
The meaning of the phrase "in the company of a person"
in the second clause of § 213A requires a . . . strict interpre-
tation. We think that for conviction under it there must be
proof of more than that the defendant merely was found in
the same place with a person known by the defendant to pos-
sess narcotics. . . . [TIhe words "in the company of" imply
"something that smacks of fellowship . . . [or] companion-
ship, friendly intercourse, and the like." Coupled with the
requirement (in the second clause) of knowledge of the illegal
possession of a narcotic by the companion, the words import
(a) acquiescent association with another, known to possess
narcotics, and (b) an absence of prompt and adequate objec-
tion by the defendant to the illegal possession. A violation
of the second clause of § 213A is made out by proof that the
defendant had more than casual or momentary association
with another, with knowledge of the latter's illegal possession,
unless the defendant shows facts constituting justification or
TDId. at 388 (quoting OKLA. Comp. STAT. § 7255 (1921)).
20 Id. at 394.
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excuse (as, for example, inability to withdraw after acquiring
knowledge of possession, or reasonable cause for remaining
such as that he was a relative, priest, or doctor attempting to
discourage continued violation or, possibly, that other exculpa-
tory circumstances existed) 21
This purported clarification is confusing and contradictory. In one
sentence the court suggests that "prompt and adequate objection" to
the illegal activities might excuse an apparent violation, but in the next
clearly implies that the defendant has an affirmative duty to depart in
all but extraordinary circumstances. The court's offhanded suggestion
of other possible exculpatory circumstances offers little solace to an
individual unable to determine the basic elements of the offense with
which he is charged 2
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Citing only Robinson v. Californiae Tirella argued that the pos-
sible imposition of five years' imprisonment for violations of section
213A constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 4 But Robinson offers scant sup-
port for this claim. The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Cali-
fornia statute permitting incarceration for narcotics addiction, deciding
that a state could not imprison an individual afflicted with an illness-
addiction.
Commentary on Robinson has suggested at least three possible
rationales for the Court's decision.' Under the first, statutes punishing
"pure status" would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.26  Em-
bracing laws defining crimes in terms of personal characteristics rather
than acts, this rationale would not apply to section 213A, which con-
demns the specific acts of being present or associating. A second
interpretation of Robinson would invalidate statutes penalizing a person
for a condition from which he is unable to extricate himself, or for
acts associated with such a condition. 7 This interpretation would
21355 Mass. at -, 249 N.E2d at 575.
22 The relatively recent enactment of § 213A's companionship clause, see 355 Mass.
at -, 249 N.E.2d at 574 n.1, 575 n.2, presents another possible ground for a vagueness
attack: the legislature failed to act with sufficient precision in defining the contours of
newly prohibited activity. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Note, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctr in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 84 (1960)
("[L]egislation creating 'new' crimes . . . is particularly vulnerable to vagueness
attack.").
=370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24 Brief for Defendant at 7, Commonwealth v. Tirella, 355 Mass. -, 249 N.E2d
573 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tirella Brief].
25 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, 79 HAxv. L. REv. 635, 646-50 (1966).
26Id. 650.
27Id. 650-54.
1970]
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invalidate a conviction under section 213A only if the defendant was
unable to remove himself from the vicinity of the illicitly held drugs
or from the company of a possessor. A third rationale merely qualifies
the other two interpretations of Robinson by considering the volun-
tariness of an individual's acquisition of his condition. A statute could
constitutionally punish only voluntarily acquired conditions or volun-
tary acts.28 Because section 213A prohibits only voluntary acts, punish-
ment would not be invalid under this theory of Robinson.
Section 213A may also be sustained under the more traditional
interpretation of the eighth amendment as prohibiting only inherently
cruel punishments."9 In Trop v. Dulles, ° Chief Justice Warren noted
that "[t] he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man." " Only punishments denying the hu-
manity of the criminal are unconstitutional.- But neither clause of
section 213A imposes an inhuman penalty.
A final possible interpretation of the eighth amendment, however,
supports a challenge to the Massachusetts statute. In Weems v. United
States,;" the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for falsification of
documents under a Philippine statute establishing a minimum penalty
of twelve-years and one-day confinement in chains at hard labor plus
the loss of numerous civil rights. Comparing this penalty with those
for crimes generally considered more serious, the Court concluded that
the sentence required by the statute was cruelly excessive, for even
the crime of forgery or of counterfeiting United States securities per-
mitted only a fifteen-year maximum and a fine, but no similar loss of
civil rights.
Under the provisions of the Massachusetts narcotics laws, various
crimes generally considered more serious than a 213A violation may
be punished with the same sentence as authorized by the latter section.
For example, possession of heroin, 4 sale of narcotics,35 possession of
narcotics for sale, 6 or stealing of narcotics 37 may result in merely a
five-year prison term for a first offender-the same penalty which may
be imposed as a maximum for a violation of section 213A. A com-
28 Id. 654-55.
29 See In re Kemnler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ; Note, Revival of the Eighth
Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16
STAN. L. REv. 996, 997 (1964). In upholding death by electrocution, the Court
stated in Kennuler: "[Cruel and unusual punishment] implies . . . something inhuman
and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life." 136 U.S. at 447.
30 356 U.S. 86 (1958). The Court held unconstitutional a statute stripping a
wartime deserter of his citizenship. Three Justices concurred in Chief Justice
Warren's view that this was cruel and unusual punishment.
3' Id. at 100.
32 Note, supra note 29, at 1002.
33 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
34 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 94, §212 (1967).
35 d. §217.
36 Id. §217B.
37 1d. § 217C.
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parison of the maximum penalties for possession of narcotics (three
and one-half years) 38 and for being in the company of one illegally in
possession of narcotics (five years) 39 exposes an anomaly in the statu-
tory scheme: the companion of the illegal possessor could receive a
harsher sentence than the possessor himself. An application of the
Weems rationale to this situation might result in a declaration that
section 213A authorizes a cruelly excessive sentence.
40
IV. INFERENCE OF GUILT FROM PROOF OF AssOCIATION
Criminal statutes penalizing mere presence or association are rare.
The common law has generally viewed presence at the scene of a crime
as an act without culpability and has attached criminal penalties only
to presence or association evidencing an active encouragement of
illegal activity." But a statute prohibiting certain types of association
may be an attempt to eliminate an underlying evil not easily attacked
directly. Tirella argued that section 213A was such a statute, because
it established a presumption of guilt of illegal narcotics activity from
proof of companionship or presence." Under this interpretation, the
constitutionality of the statute could have been sustained only by
demonstrating the presumption's rationality.43
In Tot v. United States,44 the Supreme Court articulated a test
for evaluating a statutory presumption similar to that found in section
213A. Upon a showing of possession, the Federal Firearms Act
45
permitted conviction for unlawful receipt 46 of a firearm or ammunition
transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Possession of the fire-
arm established a presumption that it had moved in commerce. In
holding this presumption violative of due process, the Court stated:
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the
other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the
two in common experience. . . . [W]here the inference is
38M. § 205. This section does not penalize possession of heroin, an independent
offense punished under id. § 212.
39 Id. § 213A.
40 The Massachusetts court rejected a similar challenge to the narcotics laws as
applied to marijuana, on the grounds that the statute provides for no mandatory
minimum sentence and that the sentencing judge can be trusted to use his discretion
wisely. Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. -, 243 N.E2d 898, 906 (1969). But this
sentencing discretion merely increases the danger articulated by the dissenting justices
in Tirella that § 213A may be used discriminatorily as a dragnet statute. 355 Mass.
at -, 249 N.E.2d at 577.
411 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 108 (1957).
42 Tirella Brief 5-6.
43 See, e.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).
44 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
45 Ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1251 (1938).
46 Receipt was unlawful for individuals who had been convicted of a crime of
violence, or were fugitives from justice. Id.
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so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circum-
stances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the
legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of
courts.47
The Court has followed this test in subsequent decisions. 4  In
United States v. Gainey,49 the majority sustained the inference that
unexplained presence at an illegal still evidenced participation in illicit
distillation, because it felt that anyone so present must play some part
in the enterprise. In United States v. Romano, ° however, the Court
invalidated a similar presumption that presence at a still was sufficient
evidence to permit conviction on a charge of possession, custody, and
control of the still. The Court noted:
Presence is relevant and admissible evidence in a trial on a
possession charge; but absent some showing of the defendant's
function at the still, its connection with possession is too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt . . . ..
More recently, in Leary v. United States,52 the Court held invalid the
statutory inference that a possessor of marijuana knew of its illegal
importation. Because a substantial amount of marijuana is grown
domestically, a possessor would not likely know that his marijuana was
illegally imported.
If intended to deter other, more serious narcotics violations by
the defendant, section 213A rests upon the presumption that those
discovered in the presence of narcotics or in the company of a pos-
sessor are also engaged or likely to engage in unlawful activity. But
this presumption is of questionable validity at best. Individuals asso-
ciate with one another for many reasons, and the activity covered by
section 213A in no way necessarily correlates with the commission of
more serious narcotics violations by those associating with possessors.
The Tirella court never had to resolve this issue, however, for it
rejected the view that section 213A established a legislative presump-
tion of guilt of serious narcotics violations from proof of presence or
association and held that the Massachusetts legislature had prohibited
the act of association itself.' The statute imposed a coercive ostracism
upon those knowingly violating the Commonwealth's other narcotics
laws. Although neatly avoiding the issue of the rationality of any
47 319 U.S. at 467-68 (footnote omitted).
48 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1970); Leary v.
United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-34 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
139 (1965) ; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66-68 (1965).
49380 U.S. 63 (1965).
50 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
51 Id. at 141.
52 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
53355 Mass. at -, 249 N.E2d at 576.
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legislative presumption, this interpretation of the statute exposed a
more fundamental difficulty-the legislature's power to curtail free
association.
V. DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE
The Tirella court dealt summarily with the constitutional problems
posed by an interpretation of section 213A as proscribing association
with an illegal possessor of narcotics to deprive him "of any encourage-
ment which may be given by acquiescent companionship." " It relied
exclusively upon the unreasoned holding in Buckley that the "presence
clause" of section 213A did not abridge any right of association to rebut
a similar attack against the "companionship clause." But this approach
ignored the difference between the two clauses: the "presence clause"
abridges association between individuals only incidentally, but the
"companionship clause" is directed primarily toward associative con-
duct. 5
Although appealing on its face, a claim that a right of free
association has been abridged raises several difficulties when applied
to the Massachusetts statute. First, the doctrine of free association
has not been fully developed, in part because of its comparatively recent
formulation." Second, commentators have generally discussed the
doctrine in the context of the first amendment and political association. 7
But the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments
afford protection to the association affected by section 213A.
In Scales v. United States;" the Supreme Court squarely faced
the question whether mere membership in a group, or association with
persons who advocate the violent overthrow of the government, justifies
the imposition of criminal sanctions. Although the opinion dealt in
part with first amendment freedoms, the Court sustained the federal
statute 9 against a fifth amendment due process attack, carefully
defining the constitutionally permissible scope of criminal liability for
mere association. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Harlan set
strict standards for determining culpability:
54 Id.
05 Although most relevant to the "companionship clause," the following discussion
also applies to the "presence clause" insofar as an individual could be prosecuted for
being in the presence of an illegal possessor. For eaxample, Tirella might have been
convicted under the "presence clause" for being in a car in which he knew narcotics
were illegally kept. Under these circumstances, the impact of the presence clause
upon association should be judged by the same constitutional standards applied to the
companionship clause.
5 See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE
L.J. 1 (1964). Emerson views the right of association as originating with the 1958
Supreme Court decision in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
57 For a typical discussion, see Emerson, supra note 56.
58 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
59 Act of June 25, 1948 (Smith Act), ch. 645, § 2385, 62 Stat. 808, as amended
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964) (prohibiting membership in organizations advocating the
violent overthrow of the government).
19701
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In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the im-
position of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be
justified by reference to the relationship of that status or con-
duct to other concededly criminal activity . . . that relation-
ship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of
personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due
Process Clause . . 6
The kind of association protected in Scales is strikingly similar
to that found criminal under section 213A. Like that section, the
federal statute challenged in Scales apparently imposed sanctions on
inactive members or associates. Although interpreting the statute to
require some "active" membership-conduct furthering the unlawful
purpose of the group-the Court clearly implied that passive association
with wrongdoers could not be constitutionally prohibited:
It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely be-
comes a member of an illegal organization, by that "act"
alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent
to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on
the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes
from the knowledge that others believe in what the organiza-
tion is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and
encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus
given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a
commitment on the part of a conspirator to act in furtherance
of that enterprise."'
Although not explicitly based on a right of association,6 2 this
reasoning supports the proposition that companionship or presence alone
is not constitutionally punishable. A specific criminal act may be
unnecessary to attach guilt, but some support directly furthering conduct
the state may legitimately prohibit is essential. The punishment of
companions to reduce the incidence of a forbidden activity is uncon-
stitutional.63
The protection afforded association by Scales suggests that the
constitutionality of section 213A should be judged in light of the
availability of less restrictive means for accomplishing the legislative
60 367 U.S. at 224-25.
i1 Id. at 227-28.
62 In its discussion of first amendment issues, the Scales Court explicitly recog-
nized a right of association. Id. at 229.
63 In the absence of a statute, the Massachusetts court has refused to permit
conviction of a substantive crime upon evidence of mere association. In Common-
wealth v. Fancy, 349 Mass. 196, 207 N.E.2d 276 (1965), the court reversed Fancy's
conviction for the theft of liquor. The defendant's association with the convicted
thief, however suspicious, was insufficient to establish his guilt. The Massachusetts
court has thus acted in accord with judicial opinion repudiating guilt by association
as a basis for imposing criminal sanctions. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79
(1959) ; cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
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purpose." Assuming that the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature
is to curtail the possession and dissemination of dangerous drugs,
clearly less restrictive means are available to accomplish this result."5
Stiffer penalties for use or possession, more vigorous enforcement of
other, narrower regulatory measures, or chemical tests to identify nar-
cotics users all deter drug abuse, but have no effect on companions or
guests of an illegal possessor. Although section 213A may possibly
be an effective tool for controlling drug abuse, both the rationality and
the constitutionality of prohibiting companionship or presence to solve
the abuse problem are doubtful in light of the availability of less
restrictive alternatives.
Other, less explicit constitutional doctrines also cast doubt on the
validity of the Massachusetts statute. When important personal rights
were involved, the Supreme Court has occasionally overturned statutes
without closely tying its decision to a specific provision of the Consti-
tution. Whether such decisions result from considerations of the
fundamentals of an American scheme of ordered liberty,"' from circum-
stances shocking to the Court's conscience,17 or from an analysis of
penumbras emanating from the Bill of Rights,"' they express "long-
range community values perceived by the judiciary but not necessarily
reflected by the Constitution. 0 9
Conduct analogous to that proscribed by section 213A has been
protected under constitutional doctrines such as those enumerated
above. For example, Griswold v. Connecticut70 and Loving v. Vir-
ginia"' both indicate that association in marriage merits special pro-
tection from state regulation. The state may not unduly restrict at
least certain kinds of association. Although dicta in Tirella implies
that section 213A does not prohibit contact with relatives, doctors, or
spiritual advisors,72 the state's power to deprive a narcotics violator
of other types of companionship is questionable.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has examined various constitutional challenges to
a Massachusetts statute attempting to reduce drug abuse. In upholding
the statute in Buckley and Tirella, the Supreme Judicial Court of
6 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964) ; Weaver v.
Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 414 (1926).
65 Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. Rtv. 1048,
1089 (1968).
6 6 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
67 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
69 Ratner, supra note 65, at 1057.
70 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Tirella cited Griswold. Tirella Brief 6.
71388 U.S. 1 (1967).
72 355 Mass. at -, 249 N.E2d at 575.
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Massachusetts considered and rejected many arguments which merited
closer scrutiny.
Although the court's finding that section 213A prohibits com-
panionship or presence itself forecloses a claim that the statute embodies
an unconstitutional presumption, and although the section probably
does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, the vagueness and due
process arguments raised by the defendants are more compelling. The
court's attempted clarification of the statutory language was inadequate,
although a future decision may obviate problems of vagueness. To
the extent that the statute curtails the right of free association implicitly
recognized in Scales, however, it is unconstitutional.
Faced with a constitutional challenge to a provision similar to
section 213A,7" the California Supreme Court in People v. Cressey '
recognized that mere presence where marijuana was being used could
not be proscribed in a number of situations.7 5 Emphasizing that the
trial court had found that the defendant had possessed the marijuana,7"
the supreme court held the statute constitutionally applicable. But the
opinion requires a degree of personal culpability beyond mere knowing
association. The court stated:
As this court has held: "If the defendant 'did not act to
aid, assist, or abet' the perpetration of the crime, he is guilty
of no violation of law from the mere fact that he was pres-
ent . . " and knew of its commission.
77
The Cressey court's concern with the constitutional ability of the
state to penalize mere presence contrasts sharply with the view of the
Massachusetts court. Clearly something more than passive presence
or association is necessary to satisfy the mandates of due process-the
personal culpability required in Cressey is the minimum involvement
constitutionally punishable.
Frank W. Molloy
73 See CAL. HEALT= & SAFETY CODE § 11556 (West 1964).
74- Cal. 2d -, - P.2d -, 87 Cal. Rptr. 699 (1970).
75
We recognize that a literal reading of Health and Safety Code section
11556 could proscribe some kinds of conduct which cannot constitutionally be
considered criminal. If one purchases a ticket and enters a motion picture
theater where one has every right to remain, and midway through the film one
views a person in the theater whom one knows to be smoking marijuana, must
one (a) leave immediately for fear of prosecution under section 11556, or (b)
force the smoker to stop using the narcotics? An individual might find
himself in situations, such as at a party, theater, or dance hall, or in a hotel
lobby, bus, apartment, or taxi, or even in a private automobile, where he
had no relation to the acts of others who might be disposed to use marijuana.
Id. at -, - P2d at -, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
76 .Id.
771d. (quoting People v. Woodward, 45 Cal. 293, 294 (1873)).
